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Using Formulas to Separate Marital
and Nonmarital Property: A Policy
Oriented Approach to the Division of
Appreciated Property Upon Divorce
By LOUISE EVERETT GRAH*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years every writer venturing to discuss
domestic relations must have been tempted to emphasize the
importance of his or her work by opening with mention of the
growing number of divorce cases confronting the court system.'
Beyond its numerical impact upon the judicial process, however,
divorce litigation provides an important opportunity for the
study of property rights and the institutions from which those
fights are derived. Divorce cases increasingly involve difficult
and complex questions concerning the marital property rights of
the marriage partners. 2 The importance of marital property cases
is broader than the individual rules that they teach. By studying
the answers to the marital property puzzle, we learn about the
status of the institution of marriage itself. Whatever the social
value attached to that institution in theory, the actual treatment
of the parties and their property rights upon marriage dissolution
gives concrete answers to questions concerning the risks and
benefits that derive from marriage and how those risks and
benefits are divided between the parties.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1977,
University of Texas. The author wishes to thank Susan Alley, J.D. 1985, University of
Kentucky, for her research and editorial assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I Between 1970 and 1980 the divorce rate rose from 3.5 per 1,000 population to
4.2 per 1,000 population. Although there was a slight drop in the rate between 1979 and
1980, from 5.3 per 1,000 to 5.2 per 1,000, there were almost two million divorces in
1980. U.S. DE'r. OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIrED STATES 85-86 (104 ed.
1984).
2 Because irretrievable breakdown is the sole ground for divorce in Kentucky,
there is almost no litigation concerning entitlement to a divorce. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
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By allocating to married persons particular property rights
upon divorce, the legal system has sought to protect spousal
expectations with regard to participation in marriage.3 Thus,
modern marital property law generally treats married persons as
partners and the marriage as an economic partnership. 4 As com-
mentators have often pointed out, treatment of marriage as an
§ 403.140(1)(c) (Baldwin 1984) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The few questions that remain
generally relate to the trial court's ability to refuse or to order conciliation conferences,
see, e.g., Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973), or to grant legal separation
rather than an absolute divorce, see, e.g., La Fosse v. La Fosse, 564 S.W.2d 220 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978). In contrast, an increasing number of assets has been subject to scrutiny
as potential marital property. See Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 947-48 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984) (goodwill of a professional practice treated as divisible marital property);
Quiggens v. Quiggens, 637 S.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (worker's compen-
sation award treated as divisible marital property); Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710,
712-13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (cash value of life insurance policy treated as divisible marital
property); Munday v. Munday, 584 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (interest in
"Clifford trust" treated as divisible marital property); Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223,
224-25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (vested pension benefits treated as divisible marital property).
In other states, divorcing couples have litigated the right to a wide array of assets. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Donnelly, 190 Cal. Rptr. 756, 757 (Ct. App. 1983) (income
protection benefits derived from life insurance policy); Cathleen C.Q. v. Norman J.Q.,
452 A.2d 951, 954-55 (Del. 1982) (country club membership); Cluck v. Cluck, 647
S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (country club membership); In re Marriage of Roark,
659 P.2d 1133, 1134-35 (Wash. App. 1983) (right to severance pay). As these cases
demonstrate, the range of assets subject to litigation is as diverse as the attorney's
imagination. A more difficult problem arises concerning the division of so-called "career
assets" and "human capital." One commentator has argued that family efforts to
promote the career of one spouse result in "career assets," which should belong to the
marital unit. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181,
1210-12 (1980-81). Another argument is based upon the notion that effort expended to
achieve a professional degree or license is "human capital" which properly belongs to
the marital community. See Bruch, The Definition of Marital Property in California:
Toward Parity and Simplicity, 62-63 (background study for California Law Revision
Commission), quoted in In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 812 (Ct. App.
1982). Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has indicated that an educational degree
or professional license may not be treated as marital property, see Inman v. Inman, 648
S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982), the court of appeals recently ruled that spousal contribution
to the acquisition of such an asset may be taken into consideration in dividing marital
property, see McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
See, e.g., Beggs v. Beggs, 479 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Ky. 1972). See generally Prager,
Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977-
78).
. UNI. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A.
93 (1979). See generally W. WEYRAucH & S. KATz, AmismcAN F my LAW iN TRaNsmoN
90-100 (1983); Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri,
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economic partnership emphasizes sharing principles that underlie
the general social conception of marriage. s Those sharing prin-
ciples are most evident in statutes providing that all property of
the parties, however and whenever acquired, is available for
equitable distribution upon marriage dissolution.
6
Emphasis upon the unity or shared aspect of marriage is not
without difficulty in a society that emphasizes individual rights.
7
A number of states, including Kentucky, have adopted marital
property rules which require differentiation between nonmarital
and marital property.8 Nonmarital property generally falls into
41 Mo. L. REv. 165, 165-67 (1976); Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property
Outdated?, 22 J. F m. L. 263, 266 (1984); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage:
Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1169, 1255-58 (1974); Younger, Marital Regimes:
A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestion
for Reform, 67 CORNEU. L. REv. 45, 64-77 (1981).
1 See, e.g., Prager, supra note 3, at 1; Weitzman, supra note 4, at 1256.
6 See UNW¢. MARRIGE AN DIVORCE ACT § 307 Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 142-
43 (1979). For a general discussion of equitable distribution in the 50 states, see Freed,
Equitable Distribution As Of December 1982, 9 F m. L. REP. (BNA) 4001 (Jan. 11,
1983).
, At common law married persons were treated as a unit with most significant
rights lodged in the husband. See 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENosH LAW 399-436 (2d ed. 1911). Perhaps the earliest harbingers of individuality
were the Married Women's Property Acts, which generally permitted women to contract
and hold property separately from their spouses. See, e.g., KRS §§ 404.010-.060. More
recent trends have permitted women to hold a domicile separately from their spouses.
See, e.g., Blair v. Blair, 85 A.2d 442, 445 (Md. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 21 (1971). It has also been held that marriage raises no presumption of
agency between the spouses. See Bennett v. Mack's Supermarkets, 602 S.W.2d 143, 146-
47 (Ky. 1979).
In a number of areas connected to domestic relations, the legal trend has been
away from the treatment of marriage partners as persons with unified interests and
toward recognition of their individual rights. In the areas of contraception and abortion,
for example, it is clear that spouses have individual rights which must be respected. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976) (husband cannot have
"veto power" over wife's decision to have an abortion).
- See KRS § 403.190 (1984). See also Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West
Cum. Supp. 1984); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1983); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5108, 5110 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113
(Bradford Cum. Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-13 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21
(West Cum. Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp.
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1 (Michie Cum. Supp.
1984).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
two categories: property acquired before marriage and property
acquired after marriage in a particular manner such as gift or
inheritance. 9 Because nonmarital property is assigned to one of
the parties and is not generally available for equitable distribu-
tion upon divorce,' 0 states adopting a rule featuring nondivisible,
nonmarital property implicitly emphasize ongoing individual rights
of spouses in addition to the rights of the marriage partnership.
When the marital partnership is dissolved, states recognizing
rights both in individual spouses and in the marital partnership
face dual tensions in the equitable distribution of assets. Not
only is there the inevitable conflict arising from each adversary
spouse's claim to a larger portion of the assets, but there is also
the additional tension inherent between the rules designed to
maximize marital partnership property and the rules requiring
recognition of the rights of individual spouses. This tension is
most readily apparent when the marital partnership and an in-
dividual spouse make a valid claim to the same asset. A clear
example of such a claim arises when, prior to marriage, one
spouse owned property which has increased in value during the
marriage, either through reduction of an outstanding mortgage
on the property or because of appreciation through inflation.
In Kentucky, appreciated property is subject to a propor-
tionate approach which looks to the source of the funds" to
determine the extent to which property is marital or nonmarital.
The Kentucky courts developed this approach in a series of cases
beginning with Robinson v. Robinson12 and ending, most re-
cently, with Brandenburg v. Brandenburg.13 Through this series
9 See, e.g., KRS § 403.190. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503; IOWA CODE
ANN. 598.21; W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1. Presumptions can operate to benefit the marital
estate. In some states, for example, property acquired during the marriage is presumed
to be marital property absent clear and convincing evidence shown by the nonmarital
claimant. See, e.g., KRS § 403.190. See also ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, § 503(b).
10 See, e.g., KRS § 403.190. But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(2) (permitting
division of nonmarital property under limited circumstances).
" Throughout this Article the Kentucky rule will be referred to as either the
"proportionate approach" or the "source of funds rule."
12 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Brandenburg
v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (disapproving Robinson dicta
that nonmonetary contribution of homemaker spouse could cause recharacterization of
increased equity in property after marriage from nonmarital to marital property).
13 617 S.W.2d 871.
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of cases the Kentucky courts have also proposed formulas for
the determination of marital and nonmarital shares in appreci-
ated property. These formulas have received serious criticism.
Detractors of the Robinson-Brandenburg formulas have argued
that such formulas deprive trial courts of needed discretion and
that the formulas work unfairness in many cases.
14
The purpose of this Article is to examine the Kentucky
approach in light of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, to
compare the Kentucky approach with that used in other states
with similar marital property laws, to determine whether the
Kentucky approach comports with other policies underlying the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act as adopted in this state, and
to evaluate both the usefulness and the fairness of the formulas.
Section I of the Article sets out the background of the Kentucky
approach. Section II analyzes the impact of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act and examines the approaches of other
states to the problem of appreciated property. Section III ad-
dresses the problem of choosing between divergent approaches.
Section IV discusses particular issues raised by the use of for-
mulas for allocating the shares of the separate and marital
estates.
I. KENTUCKY TREATMENT OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY
A. An Overview of Kentucky Rules for Property Division
In Kentucky, property division upon marriage dissolution is
controlled by statute. The property division statute mandates
segregation of the separate assets of each spouse from the marital
property of both prior to a just division of marital property.
15
Specific categories of separate property are statutorily enumer-
ated as exceptions to the general rule that marital property is all
1' Id. at 875 (Gudgel, J., concurring). See also Potter & Ewing, Apportioning
Marital and Nonmarital Interests In A Single Asset, 9 Ky. BENCH & B. 14 (April 1983).
11 See KRS § 403.190, construed in Angel v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978). See also Farmer v. Farmer, 506 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1974). When marital and
nonmarital assets have been commingled, the nonmarital claimant must overcome a
significant presumption with regard to assets acquired during the marriage. See KRS
§ 403.190(3). Kentucky requires the nonmarita claimant to trace proceeds from non-
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property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage. 6
These statutory exceptions are of two basic kinds. One type of
exception arises because of the time at which property is ac-
quired.' 7 Such a temporal exception is a corollary to the basic
marital property rule that all property acquired during the mar-
riage is marital. Property acquired by a spouse either before the
marriage or after a decree of divorce or legal separation is the
separate property of that spouse.18 The other type of exception
arises because of the manner in which a spouse acquires prop-
erty.' 9 For example, property acquired by gift or inheritance
remains the separate property of the donee or beneficiary spouse.
2
0
The only statutory exception speaking directly to appreciated
marital exchanges into currently held property. See, e.g., Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d
665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); 562 S.W.2d 661. Moreover, nonmarital claimants must trace
the specific asset. See Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The
formulas discussed in this Article assume that nonmarital claimants have successfully
traced their nonmarita contribution under Kentucky rules.
16 KRS § 403.190(2)(a)-(e), modeled after Alternative B of § 307 of the UNU'.
MARRIAGE AND DrVORCE ACT, provides that:
(2) For the purpose of this chapter, "marital property" means all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before
the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separa-
tion;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(e) The increase in value of property acquired before the marriage
to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the
parties during marriage.
17 KRS § 403.190(2) states that property acquired subsequent to the marriage and
not otherwise excluded by subsections (a) through (e) is marital property. The negative
implication of this section is that property acquired prior to the marriage is nonmarital.
Subsection 2(c), which also makes the time of acquisition dispositive of the property's
character, has been strictly interpreted. See Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163, 164
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
Is See KRS § 403.190(2), (2)(c).
19 KRS § 403.190(2)(a) and (2)(b) are wholly dependent upon the manner in which
property is acquired.
10 KRS § 403.190(2)(b). Compare Adams v. Adams, 565 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978) (interest in family corporation received without consideration is a gift) with
Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (interest received for
consideration is not a gift but marital property).
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property states that property is nonmarital if it derives from
"[t]he increase in value of property acquired before the marriage
to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts
of the parties during marriage.
'21
B. Case Law Treatment of Appreciated Property
The Kentucky courts' treatment of appreciated property has
been based upon two principles. First, the courts have judicially
defined property to include only the equity interest in an asset. 2
Second, Kentucky courts have used a "source of funds" rule to
permit property to have dual characteristics-a particular asset
can be both marital and nonmarital.? Although the courts have
been consistent in their use of a source of funds or proportionate
approach, they have differed in the exact formulae used to
allocate appreciated value to the nonmarital and marital estates. 24
During the past decade, inflated values for real property have
accentuated this problem.
25
In Robinson v. Robinson,26 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
adopted the first in a series of formulae designed to allocate
property appreciation between the nonmarital and marital es-
tates. The Robinson court declared that "the equity in ...
property shall be considered nonmarital at the time of separation
in that proportion which this [nonmarital] equity bore to the
value of the property at the time of the marriage. ' 27 The court's
21 KRS § 403.190(2)(e).
- See Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
21 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872; Newman v. New-
man, 597 S.W.2d 137, 138-39 (Ky. 1980). The source of funds approach gives rise to
an interest in the property on the part of both estates. Its use is particularly important
if it is defined as an ownership interest rather than a right to reimbursement. See text
accompanying notes 139-46 infra. Other states that permit property to have dual char-
acteristics include Delaware, see, e.g., Frank G.W. v. Carol M.W., 457 A.2d 715, 725
(Del. 1983); Maine, see, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Me. 1983); Maryland,
see, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 928 (Md. Ct. App. 1982); and Missouri, see,
e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 10 FAms. L. REP. (BNA) 1637, 1637-38 (Sept. 11, 1984).
2A See text accompanying notes 26-50 infra.
25 See generally Potter & Ewing, supra note 14, at 14 ("when applied to mortgaged
property that has appreciated in value during the marriage, the [Brandenburg] formula
unjustly favors the non-marital interest").
569 S.W.2d 178.
Id. at 181.
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example for the use of its formula involved a nonmarital estate
which had contributed $20,000 prior to the marriage toward the
purchase of property valued at $40,000 at the time of the mar-
riage. 28 After marriage the mortgage was retired through marital
contributions, and at divorce the property value was $60,000.29
Using this example, the formula adc pted by the Robinson court
may be expressed as follows:
Formula 1
nmc ($20,000) 30
fmvm ($40,000) x fmvd ($60,000) $30,000 nmp
One year after Robinson, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reaffirmed portions of the Robinson formula in Woosnam v.
Woosnam.31 Patricia Woosnam owned a home with a value of
$13,300 when the parties married. 32 The property was subject to
a $9,446.23 mortgage. 33 Several years after the marriage the
Woosnams sold the property for $37,500 and purchased a second
home. 34 Although the trial court had allowed Patricia a non-
marital share of the first home based on the relationship of her
28 Id. On the actual facts of Robinson the court dealt with two pieces of property.
Mrs. Robinson owned a one-half interest in property called the Apple House Market.
Id. at 179. She failed, however, to demonstrate that she had any equity in that property
at the time of the marriage. Id. at 181. The court ruled that the value of that property
after mortgage satisfaction was marital. Id. Mr. Robinson had purchased the Dairy
Maid Drive-In prior to his marriage and had paid some $19,000 as a down payment and
premarital mortgage payments. Id. at 180. The $11,000 balance was wholly satisfied
after the marriage. Id. at 180-81. The court ruled that when the value of the Dairy Maid
Drive-In was established, 19/30 of that sum was to be assigned as nonmarital property.
Id. at 181.
29 Id. at 181.
" For purposes of succinctly expressing the formulas used by the courts, the
following symbols are used: 1) nmc = nonmarital contribution; 2) fmv. = fair market
value at the date of marriage; 3) fmv, = fair market value at the date of dissolution.
In all of the Kentucky formulas, nonmarital contributions have been monetary contri-
butions despite Robinson dicta that homemaker contributions might be considered. For
a discussion of problems raised by this aspect of the rule, see text accompanying notes
176-79 infra.
' 587 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
32 Id. at 263.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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equity in that home to its total value as of the date of her
marriage, it ruled that all of the increased value in the second
home was due to marital effort.35 The court of appeals reversed
and required the application of the proportionate approach to
both homes.3 6 The Woosnam formula, however, required the
court to subtract the value of permanent improvements attrib-
utable to marital contribution before applying the Robinson
formula. 37 The Woosnam adaptation of Robinson may be stated
as follows:
Formula 2
nmc x fmvd - (value of permanent improvements) 3
fmvm
The Robinson- Woosnam approach came before the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Newman v. Newman.39 William Newman had
inherited $52,000 and a lot valued at $3,000. 0 Together with his
wife Polly, William borrowed $13,000 and the couple used the
lot, the inherited money and the mortgage proceeds to construct
I' Id.
36 Id.
31 Nothing in the marital property statute supports this aspect of the Woosnam
formula. See KRS § 403.190.
11 Since the trial court made no finding as to the value of permanent improvements,
the Woosnam formula is difficult to apply demonstrably to the facts of the case.
However, some calculations may be attempted. Patricia's nonmarital contribution to the
first home was $3,833.77, based upon its value of $13,300 at the time of marriage and
the outstanding mortgage of $9,466.23. 587 S.W.2d at 263. That nonmarital contribution
in the first home would be approximately
Formula 6
$3,834 x $19,175 = $5,587.
$13,300
As to the second home, Patricia's nonmarital share would be
Formula 7
$5,587 x $37,500 - (x),
$23,000
where x is the unknown value of permanent improvements.
39 597 S.W.2d 137.
• Id. at 138.
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a family residence. 41 The fair market value of that residence at
the time of marriage dissolution was $125,000.42 The Supreme
Court approved the trial court's use of the Robinson propor-
tionate approach even though the separate property in Newman
had not been acquired prior to the marriage.43 In squarely re-
jecting Polly's claim that William's nonmarital contribution
should be returned to him and the remaining amounts be divided
as marital property, the Court approved the proportionate ap-
proach.44
In Brandenburg v. Brandenburg,45 the court of appeals re-
tained a proportionate approach, but adopted a new formulation
for that approach. The new formula compares the nonmarital
contribution to equity with the sum of the marital and nonmar-
ital contributions. Graphically, the formula for the nonmarital
contribution may be stated as follows:
Formula 3
nmc x equity = nmp46
tc
The Brandenburg formula differs from the earlier formulas in
41 Id.
41 Id. at 139. The formula in Newman produced the following results. William's
nonmarital interest was 55/68 or 80.88%. That interest was applied to the fair market
value at dissolution (fmv,), which was $125,000, for a nonmarital share of $101,100. Id.
43 Id. Since the property was acquired after the marriage, William as the nonmarital
claimant should have had the burden of proof, requiring him to trace his contribution
into a specific asset. See Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
" See 597 S.W.2d at 139. Any claim that the Newman Court did not approve the
proportionate approach can be laid to rest by a careful reading of the opinion. Although
the section in which the Court discusses the formula is labelled "maintenance," the
Court stated: "[W]e need, therefore, not only to determine whether the formula used
by the trial court in distinguishing marital property from nonmarital property is proper,
but to determine whether the formula was properly applied." Id. at 138. This approach
is consistent with the property statute which requires any court to first assign to each
party his or her separate property and then to divide the marital property between the
parties, see KRS § 403.190, and with the maintenance statute which makes entitlement
to maintenance dependent in part upon the extent of awards of marital property, see
KRS § 403.200 (1984).
43 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 873.
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its use of total contributions to the property rather than fair
market value at the date of the marriage and in its use of
"present equity" rather than fair market value at the date of
dissolution.
Each of the various formulas from Robinson to Brandenburg
has been adopted without significant explanation by the appellate
courts. 47 In spite of the differences in the formulas, neither the
policies behind the formulas nor the relationship of the formulas
to the property division statute has been widely examined. The
Brandenburg formula has been criticized for unfairly leveraging
the separate estate48 and for depriving trial courts of necessary
discretion. 49 Because the court of appeals' decision states that its
formula is not mandatory,50 trial courts may feel free to ignore
the rules developed in Brandenburg. Both attorneys and trial
courts, however, have been nourished on precedent and hunger
for a rule. Since it is therefore unlikely that Brandenburg will
fade away, some assessment of the formula and the proportion-
ate approach upon which it is predicated is needed. The first
question is whether the Kentucky proportionate approach is the
most appropriate rule for distributing property upon divorce. A
second issue concerns the formulas used to implement that ap-
proach.
II. EVALUATION OF THE BASIC APPROACES TO DIVISION OF
APPRECIATED PROPERTY
A. Does the Marital Property Statute Require a Proportionate
Approach?
An obvious place to begin an evaluation of Kentucky's pro-
portionate approach is with the property division statute itself.51
The statute does not deal explicitly with increased value resulting
" See Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872-74; Woosnam v. Woos-
nam, 587 S.W.2d at 263-64; Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d at 181.
1 Potter & Ewing, supra note 14, at 15.
,' 617 S.W.2d at 875 (Gudgel, J., concurring).
'o Id. at 873.
" Before undertaking that examination, however, it is important to note that
Kentucky cases deal with several distinct kinds of increased value. In some cases, property
1984-85]
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from mortgage reduction. It simply states that property acquired
before marriage is separate property and that property acquired
during the marriage belongs to the marital partnership.5 2 Ascer-
taining the definition of "property" is a critical task. In some
states, known as "inception of title" states,5 3 property means
any legally cognizable interest in an asset, including the interest
of a buyer which is encumbered by a mortgage.5 4 In these states,
the character of property is fixed at the moment of acquisition
of title and is not thereafter changed by marriage. 5- Under an
inception of title rule, a spouse who purchased Blackacre and
made only a ten percent down payment prior to marriage would
not acquire all possible interests in Blackacre prior to marriage,
but that spouse would have the dispositive interest of title. Thus,
for purposes of characterization and property division upon
divorce, the purchasing spouse would have acquired Blackacre
as separate property.5 6 In other states, however, the focus is not
on time of acquisition but the source of the funds used to acquire
value increases have resulted from the reduction of an outstanding loan obligation
secured by the property. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872-
74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). A second type of increased value is attributable to the increase
in fair market value of the property through inflation. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson,
569 S.W.2d 178, 180-81 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Finally, property may increase in value
because of postmarital permanent improvements. See, e.g., Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587
S.W.2d 262, 264 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
52 See KRS § 403.190.
1 See W. McCL4ANA HA, CommuN.Iy PROPERTY LAW IN TE UNITED STATEs § 6:6
(1982).
"4 Although inception of title states require that the spouse claiming the property
have some legally cognizable interest in the property prior to marriage, such states do
recognize interests other than the interest of a purchaser. See Strong v. Garrett, 224
S.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Tex. 1949) (husband began adverse possession under color of title
prior to marriage; property was husband's separate property under inception of title
rule).
" See Honnas v. Honnas, 648 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Ariz. 1982) (residence owned prior
to marriage retains premarital character); In re Estate of Freeburn, 555 P.2d 385, 389
(Idaho 1976) (motel acquired during marriage presumed community property); Lucas v.
Lucas, 621 P.2d 500, 501 (N.M. 1980) (proceeds from sale of covenant not to compete
were not community -property); Colden v. Alexander, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1943)
(use of community funds to pay interest and taxes does not change status of title);
Cummings v. Anderson, 614 P.2d 1283, 1286-87 (Wash. 1980) (rule applied to copur-
chasers under real estate sales contract).
56 The ownership rights of the separate property claimant may, however, be subject
to the community's right to reimbursement for community funds used to enhance the
value of the separate property. See notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text.
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property interests.57 In these states a source of funds rule defines
property as "equity" and permits property to be marital, non-
marital or some combination of both depending upon whether
marital or nonmarital funds were used to purchase the prop-
erty. 58 Because the Kentucky property division statute does not
define property, it does not itself demand either an inception of
title rule or a source of funds rule.5 9
The root of the Kentucky proportionate approach, therefore,
is the judicial definition of property as equity. 60 It is only with
this definition that the statute dictates that an asset purchased
prior to marriage, but encumbered by a mortgage reduced after
marriage with marital funds, is not wholly separate property.
6'
Because property means equity, a spouse may acquire property
prior to the marriage only to the extent that he or she has made
nonmarital contributions to the equity. 62 If the spouse with title
to the property continues to build equity during the marriage,
the property or equity will be acquired in part after the marriage.
The source of funds will be marital even though only one spouse's
salary satisfied the mortgage obligation since that salary is mar-
ital property. 63 Thus, the Kentucky rule rejects the idea that the
17 Tibbets v. Tibbets, 406 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1979) (court described source of funds
rule as "more flexible and more equitable" than inception of title rule); Harper v.
Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 923-26 (Md. Ct. App. 1972) (good comparison of inception of
title and source of funds rules).
"' For a discussion of the policies underlying the source of the funds rule, see text
accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
" See KRS § 403.190.
10 See Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d at 181.
6, See id. The statute is the source of the rule that premarital contributions are
nonmarital. See KRS § 403.190.
62 Of course, the source of funds rule would not change the ownership interest of
a party who owns unencumbered property prior to marriage and who makes no im-
provements to the property during marriage. Nor would the rule change ownership
during marriage. During the marriage neither spouse has an ownership interest in the
other's property. Two Kentucky cases have characterized dower as a property right that
"vests" during marriage. See Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r, 162 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Ky. 1942);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lewis, 124 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ky. 1939). However, the better
view is that dower and curtesy rights are inchoate rights. See Comment, Tax Implications
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Does the Davis Rule Still Apply in Kentucky?,
66 Ky. L.J. 889, 895-96 (1977-78). Given the inchoate nature of both dower and curtesy
rights, it is fair to say that during marriage, neither spouse has an interest in the other's
property arising solely by virtue of the marriage. See KRS § 404.010(1). However, neither
spouse may convey real property without the other's release of either dower or curtesy
rights. See Schaengold v. Behen, 208 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Ky. 1948).
63 See Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1980). Because the marital
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character of property is determined as of the date that the
titleholder takes title and looks instead to the source of the funds
used to enhance the property's equity. 4 As a result of this rule,
property may possess dual characteristics upon divorce; that is,
it may be both marital and separate.
The judicial definition of property as equity has further
implications. The value of an asset may increase not only through
the reduction of outstanding loan principal but also through
appreciation caused by inflation.65 The Robinson rule requires
the nonmarital estate to share this latter type of appreciation
with the marital estate.6 6 The definition of property as equity
means that, of the total bundle of rights we call property, only
some of those rights will be acquired prior to marriage. There-
fore, only the inflationary value attributable to those premarital
rights remains nonmarital. 67 Once Robinson requires a split in
the property based upon the source of the funds used for own-
ership acquisition, the statute requires splitting the inflationary
increase also 68
partnership is entitled to the efforts of each individual spouse during the marriage, the
Stallings Court was correct in holding that property need not have been acquired by
joint efforts in order for it to be marital. See generally W. DEFuNiAK & M. VAuGHN,
PRINCiPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 62 (2d ed. 1971).
11 This rule is consistent with the property division statute's proscription that the
manner of holding title does not defeat the presumption that the property is marital
property. See KRS § 403.190(3).
11 See Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d at 181, where the court gives an example
using property valued at $40,000 at the time of the marriage and worth $60,000 at
divorce.
6 See id. See also note 30 supra and accompanying text.
67 The Robinson formula assumes that the inflationary growth of the property
depends upon both premarital and marital equity. In an earlier Article commenting on
the Robinson-Brandenburg formulas, a coauthor and I noted that one problem with
these formulas was their assumption of a constant rate of inflation. See Graham &
Jakubowicz, Domestic Relations Survey, 70 Ky. L.J. 425, 447 n.l16 (1981-82). Cf.
Gillespie v. Gillespie, 506 P.2d 775, 779 (N.M. 1973) (rate of return on nonmarital
investment tied to an escalating prime rate because of the length of the marriage). This
observation may be important to a separate property claimant whose premarital contri-
butions occurred during times of double digit inflation and who forsees marital contri-
butions during less rapid growth. To a large extent, however, this problem is avoided
by the use of the fair market value at marriage (fmvJ) in the Robinson formula, which
should allocate all premarital growth to the separate property claimant. See Woosnam
v. Woosnam, 587 S.W.2d at 263-64.
- See KRS § 403.190(2)(e). The Robinson rule does not deal with the issue of
whether increase in value due to the efforts of only one spouse may be marital property
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In summary, the Robinson proportionate approach is dic-
tated not by the marital property statute, 69 but by a judicial
definition of property requiring allocation of property according
to the source of funds used to acquire the asset.70 Because the
statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is profitable
to examine the experience of other courts with similar statutes.
B. Community Property States' Treatment of Appreciated
Property
Although Kentucky is not a community property state, Ken-
tucky's property division statute has its source in the marital
property law of such states. The Kentucky statute derives from
the 1970 version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
71
This act has been interpreted as adopting community property
rules for property division upon divorce. 72 Thus, Kentucky may
be said to have adopted a division scheme that is generally
similar to community property law: Kentucky law recognizes two
under subsection (2)(e). Kentucky courts have indicated that "joint or team" efforts
may convert the increase in value of nonmarital property to marital property. See
Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d at 164. The language regarding team effort stems from
cases that precede the adoption of the UNIU. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT [hereinafter
cited as the UMDA] in Kentucky. See, e.g., Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 826-27
(Ky. 1970). The notion of team effort in Colley should be taken as a prestatutory
formulation of the concept of marital partnership. It should not be extended to require
that each party in a marital partnership must make a monetary contribution in order
for an increase in value to be excluded from subsection (2)(e) and have as its source
marital funds. If the marital partnership and the notion of deferred community has any
meaning, it is that the partnership should benefit from those gains acquired through the
efforts of either spouse during the marriage. See generally W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,
supra note 63, at § 62. Thus an individual spouse's salary is clearly marital property.
See 606 S.W.2d at 163. Increased value due to mortgage reduction or improvements
from that salary are also marital property. See Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d
at 872.
, See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
71 Kentucky adopted a version of the UMDA in 1972. See Act of Mar. 25, 1972,
1972 Ky. Acts ch. 182 §§ 1-27 (codified at KRS 403.010-.350 (1984)). This state's version
of the UMDA is based upon the original bill drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws. The UMDA was amended in 1973 to meet complaints of the Family Law Section
of the American Bar Association. L. HAREM, DiVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND
SoCIAL PERSPECTrvES 270-79 (1980). For a discussion of the complaints raised by the
Family Law Section, see Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, 7 FAm. L.Q. 169 (1973).
2 See Podell, supra note 71, at 175.
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estates, marital and separate, and it allocates property to them
upon divorce based upon the time or manner of acquisition of
the property.7 3 For this reason, an assessment of community
property rules related to division of increased value becomes
important.
All community property states regulate by statute both the
existence of community property74 and its availability for division
upon divorce.7 - Differences in the statutes76 do not override
certain common themes affecting the apportionment of increased
value. While various states differ in their characterization of the
community's interest,77 the rules under which they approach the
problem are sufficiently similar for meaningful comparison. The
primary historical distinction made by all community property
states is the differentiation between increase in value due to
labor of one or both of the spouses and increase in value due
to other causes.7 8 These "other" causes are widely varied and
may include such causes as general inflation and increased mar-
ket demand for a particular product. 79 The common denomina-
tor is that these causes are not related to spousal effort. For
73 For a general discussion of community property laws, see W. McCLANAHAN,
supra note 53. See also W. DEFuNiAx & M. VAUGHN, supra note 63.
14 See W. McCLANAHnA, supra note 53, at §§ 4.13-4.14.
71 See id. at § 4.30.
76 All states treat increased value due to capital appreciation differently from rent
or profits. See id. at §§ 6:9-6: 10. As to income from separate property, Louisiana, Texas
and Idaho treat that income as community property. See id. at § 6:12. The other
community property states follow a rule that such property remains separate. See id. at
§ 6:13. The latter rule is the result of the imposition of common law solutions upon a
community system. See Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in Cali-
fornia's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1976-77).
" New Mexico appears to give the community a lien against separate property for
the value of the community interest. See, e.g., Bustos v. Bustos, 673 P.2d 1289, 1291
(N.M. 1983); Portillo v. Shappie, 636 P.2d 878, 879 (N.M. 1981); Michelson v. Mich-
elson, 551 P.2d 638, 644 (N.M. 1976). Texas clearly would not permit separate property
to be awarded to the community. See, e.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 215
(Tex. 1982); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977). In California,
however, the interest of the community is sufficient to support an award of the property
itself to the community. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hayden, 177 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Jafeman, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973); Vieux v. Vieux, 251 P. 640, 643 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1926).
78 See W. DEFuNiAr & M. VAUGHN, supra note 63, at § 62.
See Spector v. Spector, 531 P.2d 176, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (increase in
value due to real estate boom).
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purposes of historical description and discussion this Article will
refer to these causes by their historical name, "inherent causes."
Because the Kentucky approach is based upon a judicially
created source of funds rule,80 it is useful to examine rules for
division in Texas, a community property state that has consist-
ently implemented the alternative inception of title rule.8 Under
that rule a spouse who purchased an asset before the marriage
would retain that asset as separate property upon divorce, even
though the purchase was encumbered by a mortgage and the
mortgage obligation was satisfied with community funds.8 2 Sim-
ilarly, a spouse who began a business prior to marriage in an
inception of title state would be able to claim that business as
his or her separate asset.83 In order to prevent unjust enrichment
of the spouse claiming the separate property, Texas has permit-
ted the community to claim an equitable right of reimbursement
for money used to reduce mortgage obligations or to otherwise
enhance property.84 As to real property, Texas courts have per-
mitted an award of the lesser of the enhanced value or the
amount expended.85 However, in cases not involving real prop-
erty, Texas has permitted satisfaction of the community's interest
in property which has appreciated during the marriage. Thus,
See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
, See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984); Vallone v. Vallone,
644 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1982); Norris v. Vaughn, 260 S.W.2d 676, 679-80 (Tex.
1953).
'2 See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109; Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at
458 (spouse allowed to keep initial percentage traceable to separate estate).
" See Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (Tex. 1935). The reimbursement rule
applied in Dakan, along with similar rules, developed at a time when the husband was
the manager of the community assets. Additionally, these early cases involved improve-
ments to real property that could not, consistently with other property rules, be separated
from the real property to which they had become affixed. A compromise between the
fixture rules and the necessity of protecting a wife from a breach of fiduciary trust by
the husband, produced the reimbursement rule. See In re Marriage of Warren, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 860, 862-63 (Ct. App. 1972). The Texas reimbursement rule does not permit the
court to award the property itself to the community claimant. See Cameron v. Cameron,
641 S.W.2d at 215; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 142.
11 See, e.g., Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977);
Colden v. Alexander, 171 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1943); Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d at 627.
Other community property states permit more varied types of reimbursement. See, e.g.,
Cockrill v. Cockrill, 601 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Ariz. 1979).
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the Texas courts have denied reimbursement where one spouse
has received remuneration from a separate business during the
marriage.8
6
This rule of ongoing apportionment has received recent at-
tention from Texas courts in cases in which the disputed asset
was a business begun by one spouse prior to the marriage. In
Jensen v. Jensen,8 7 the Texas Supreme Court dealt with the
increased value of stock in a closely held corporation. Prior to
his marriage to Burlene Jensen, Robert Jensen was the owner
of RLJ Enterprises. 81 Some four months prior to the marriage,
RLJ Enterprises acquired Newspaper Enterprises, Inc., in a
"unique" business opportunity. 89 Robert Jensen was described
by the court as the key man of RLJ Enterprises; during the
marriage he drew salary, bonuses and dividends from the cor-
poration.90 His salary drawn from the corporation rose from
approximately $64,000 in 1976 to $100,000 in 1979.91 The Texas
Supreme Court held that the Jensens' community estate did have
an interest in the increased value of the RLJ stock.92 Reaffirming
the inception of title rule, however, the court held that the stock
was owned by Robert Jensen and that the community's interest
was an interest in reimbursement for Jensen's work effort during
the marriage. 93
The Texas reimbursement rule possesses two significant qual-
ifications. First, under Jensen the separate property owner is
entitled to expend sufficient effort to manage and preserve a
separate estate. 94 Second, community reimbursement at divorce
must be determined only after subtracting all forms of reim-
bursement received by the separate owner spouse during the
" See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 458-60. Accord Weinberg v. Weinberg,
432 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1967); Speer v. Quinlin, 525 P.2d 314 (Idaho 1974). Arizona has in
some cases refused to treat the salary as the measure of the community interest. See,
e.g., Evans v. Evans, 288 P.2d 775, 777 (Ariz. 1955); Lawson v. Ridgeway, 233 P.2d
459, 464 (Ariz. 1951). However, it has permitted ongoing apportionment, even in the
context of real property. See Tester v. Tester, 597 P.2d 194, 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
" Id. at 108.
s9 Id.
90 See id.
91 Id.
See id. at 109.
9 See id.
Id. at 110.
[Vol. 73
APPRECIATED MARITAL PROPERTY
marriage. 95 The effect of this ongoing apportionment rule can
be seen by noting the Jensen court's statement that if Robert
Jensen had been adequately compensated during the marriage,
Burlene Jensen would have had no claim for reimbursement. 96
The strict inception of title rules applied in Texas may be
contrasted with rules developed by the California courts. In
Pereira v. Pereira,97 the California Supreme Court held that
although the community was entitled to the increased value
attributable to the efforts of either spouse, the separate property
owner was entitled to retain some portion of a business attrib-
utable to inherent increase in the value of his or her originai
interest. 98 The court noted that Frank Pereira's original capital
investment remained in the business while he carried on its
operations during the marriage. 99 That investment was an essen-
tial part of the business even though Pereira's own skill ac-
counted for the principal portion of the increase in value.' °° On
these facts, the court adopted the rule that the separate property
owner was entitled to a portion of the increase in value that was
"at least [equal] to the usual interest on a long investment well
secured."' 0 '
Pereira has not remained the sole apportionment rule in
California. In Van Camp v. Van Camp,02 the California Court
of Appeals upheld an apportionment formula which determined
the reasonable value of the separate property claimant's services
as the value of the community interest and which allocated the
excess increase to the separate estate. 0 3 Though Van Camp also
involved a premarital business, the court departed from the
Pereira rule on the ground that Van Camp's participation in the
business was not necessarily more important to its success than
was his original investment. 104 The court pointed out that under
the Pereira rule had Van Camp hired a manager for his business,
the entire business would have remained his separate property
95 Id.
" Id. at 109-10.
103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909).
" See id. at 491.
99 Id.
t' Id.
- See id.
'0 199 P. 885 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
See id. at 889.
'o, See id.
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because none of it would have resulted from his labor. 0 5 The
court noted it would be unfair to deprive Van Camp of the
increase in value so long as the community was adequately
compensated for his work effort." 6
Strictly segregating "work effort" increases from increases
due to "inherent causes," the earliest rules in California appor-
tioned property between the marital and separate estates accord-
ing to causation. 0 7 Although recognizing that this total increase
in value might proceed from both types of causes, the early rules
did not permit the community to share in increases attributable
to inherent causes.108 In a recent series of cases dealing with real
property, California courts have taken a new approach to the
valuation of separate and community interests when a separate
property claimant traces the use of his or her funds to the
purchase of real property which has subsequently appreciated in
value.' 9 This approach permits both estates to share in capital
loSee id.
"1 See id. at 889-90. The Van Camp rule thus permitted a type of ongoing
apportionment in California. The California Supreme Court has approved both the
Pereira and Van Camp rules for valuation of a business. See Beam v. Bank of America,
490 P.2d 257, 261 (Cal. 1971). California courts apply the apportionment rule not only
to investments in a business, but also to real estate and securities investments. Id. See
also Kershman v. Kershman, 13 Cal. Rptr. 288, 289 (Dist. Ct. 1961) (securities invest-
ments).
See VanCamp v. VanCamp, 199 P. at 885.
See Pereira v. Pereira, 103 P. at 448.
109 One aspect of the California cases is beyond the scope of this Article. A number
of the California cases have dealt with the effects of placing property in joint tenancy.
At one time California statutes created a presumption that a single family residence held
in joint tenancy was community property. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285,
288 (Cal. 1980). The Lucas court allowed a separate property claimant to trace separate
property contributions into such a residence if the claimant could demonstrate an express
or implied agreement, which could be written or oral. Id. at 288-89. Once that tracing
was permitted under Lucas, a proportionate approach, first developed in In re Marriage
of Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 674 (Ct. App. 1979), was applied to the property.
Recent legislative amendments have overruled the tracing requirements of Lucas and
have imposed more stringent rules for tracing property. See In re Marriage of Martinez,
202 Cal. Rptr. 646, 650-54 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Marriage of Neal, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341,
345-46 (App. 1984). The legislative change affects the number of instances in which
tracing will be permitted and affects allocations of increase in value when the property
is placed in joint tenancy. See CAL. CrV. CODE § 4800 (West 1983). It does not, however,
vitiate the formulas that derive from Aufmuth in all instances. See In re Marriage of
Neal, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 346 n.ll.
The Kentucky courts have never denied a separate property claimant the ability to
trace his or her funds into property held in joint tenancy. See Farmer v. Farmer, 506
S.W.2d 109, 111-12 (Ky. 1974). Indeed, in Kentucky the only limit on tracing is the
ability to trace into a specific asset. See Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky.
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appreciation or increased value due to inherent causes. 110 Addi-
tionally, both estates share in appreciation that results from the
reduction of outstanding mortgage obligations. 111
The California rule divides increased value due to mortgage
reduction between the community and separate estates according
to actual contribution. In re Marriage of Moore'12 illustrates the
approach. Prior to her marriage to David Moore, Lydie Moore
purchased a home for $56,560.57.13 She made a down payment
of $16,640.57 and executed a mortgage for the balance of the
purchase price." 4 Before the marriage she paid $245.18 on the
outstanding loan principal." 5 After the marriage the parties made
payments on the loan principal totalling $5,986.20.116 At the time
of marriage dissolution the fair market value of the house was
$160,000.117 The division of increased value due to mortgage
reduction in Moore may be represented as follows:
Formula 4
Formula 1
a) down payment $16,640.57
b) premarital reduction
of loan principal 245.18
c) post separation payment
on mortgage principal ' 8  581.07
amount of mortgage reduction
credited to separate estate $17,466.82
Ct. App. 1978). Other UMDA states treat the placement of property in joint tenancy as
a gift by the nonmarital spouse to the marital estate. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rogers,
422 N.E.2d 635, 638-39 (Ill. 1981); In re Marriage of Emken, 427 N.E.2d 125, 126-27
(Ill. 1981); In re Marriage of Johnson, 436 N.E.2d 228, 234-35 (II1. Ct. App. 1982).
I' See In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 210-12 (Cal. 1980); In re Marriage
of Marsden, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910, 915-17 (Ct. App. 1982).
"I See 181 Cal. Rptr. at 915-17.
"2 618 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1980).
Id. at 209.
114 Id.
" Id.
116 Id.
" Id.
"I Under the California rule, postseparation payments are separate property. Under
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The California rule also requires the trial court to allocate
each estate's share of capital appreciation to that estate. 119 This
allocation is accomplished through a three-step procedure which
requires the court to (1) determine the amount of capital appre-
ciation, (2) determine the nonmarital estate's share or percentage
of capital appreciation, and (3) determine the dollar amount of
capital appreciation which belongs to each estate. 20 Using the
facts of Moore, that exercise may be represented as follows:
Formula 5
Formula 2
Amount of capital appreciation credited to separate estate
a) determination of capital appreciation:'
2'
FMVd - PP = CA
$160,000 - $56,640.57 = $103,359.43
b) determination of separate estate share:
down payment + (loan value - community payments)
purchase price
$16,640.57 + ($40,000 - $5,986.20) = 89.43% share
$56,560.57
c) dollar amount of capital for separate estate:
separate estate share x CA = separate estate's dollar
amount of capital
89.43% x $103,359.43 = $92,434.34
Finally, the sums of formula one ($17,466.82) and formula two
($92,434.34) are added together for the total separate or non-
marital share of the asset.
This examination of the rules in community property states
demonstrates a number of points. First, the diversity of rules
Kentucky law, such a payment would be a marital contribution unless it followed a
legal, rather than a physical, separation. See Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d at 163-
64.
119 See In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d at 210-11.
,21 See id. at 211.
,21 FMVd means fair market value at dissolution and PP means purchase price. CA
means capital appreciation.
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among these states means that there is no single community
property law that provides a lodestar for decisions. Second,
community property states have, in some cases, applied differing
rules to real property and business assets, permitting ongoing
apportionment only with the latter type of asset. 122 Third, al-
though older decisions tended to strictly segregate inherent cause
appreciation from work effort appreciation,'2 some courts have
begun to permit both estates to share as joint investors in capital
appreciation. 2 4
III. DEVELOPING OTHER CRITERIA FOR CHOosING BETWEEN
RULEs FOR DivisION OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY
Two normative bases for evaluating Kentucky's treatment of
division of appreciated property have already been explored: the
extent to which the marital property statute demands a propor-
tionate approach' 25 and the extent to which the Kentucky rule
derives from community property law. 2 6 Neither of these criteria
is dispositive since the property statute does not necessarily
compel a source of funds approach and since the approaches of
the community property states are diverse. Other criteria, there-
fore, must provide the answer.' 27 Many persons regard rules
dividing marital property upon divorce as being protective of
the parties' justifiable expectations with regard to marriage. 2 8
Those expectations might also form normative criteria against
which a rule could be tested. Professors Weinstein and Bruch
have effectively used arguments based in part upon spousal
expectations to defend significant allocation of marital property
12 See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
,24 See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
123 See text accompanying notes 51-68 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 71-124 supra.
127 The pitfalls of attempting to develop normative criteria for domestic relations
cases are obvious. Divorce courts necessarily possess wide discretion. KRS § 403.190(1)
requires the court to divide the property in "just proportions." KRS § 403.200 requires
the court to determine whether the party claiming a right to maintenance can meet his
or her reasonable needs. The existence of discretion, however, does not make it impos-
sible to develop normative criteria for assessment of the general guidelines.
"I See, e.g., Prager, supra note 3, at 2-14.
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to homemaker spouses and to argue that earning capacity ac-
quired during the marriage should belong to the marital part-
nership. 129 One problem with using party expectations as criteria
is that these expectations have themselves become increasingly
diverse. While thirty years ago most prospective marital couples
may have contemplated husbands wbn worked outside the home
and wives who worked within the home, today it is not possible
to identify a typical marriage structure. 30
In many other areas of the law, rules are perceived as allo-
cating risks to the parties entering a legal relationship. All of us
are familiar with rules which allocate the risk of loss between
buyer and seller'3 ' or which allocate other risks of nonperform-
ance between parties to commercial transactions.1 12 That such
rules have not been applied in domestic relations cases is a
reflection of our reluctance to admit that there are some simi-
larities between those transactions and the economic aspect of
marriage. Both the marital partnership and the commercial trans-
action are relational1 33 and each involves real economic risks
associated with the breakdown of the relationship.'1 This ad-
mission need not deny the emotional content of intimate rela-
tionships nor require us to treat every aspect of marriage as if
it were a commercial venture.
Although various rules for apportionment currently place the
economic risks of marriage and divorce upon either the individ-
ual's separate estate or the marital estate, the rules have been
developed without any assessment of the policies reflected by
the risk assignments. By identifying the risks involved, it is
possible to make a more forthright evaluation of property divi-
sion rules and, thus, to judge the uses to which the marriage
institution has been molded. 
35
"1 See Bruch, supra note 2, at 62-63; Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1210-12.
130 For a discussion of the changing roles of men and women see Bratt, Joint
Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 277-80 (1978-79).
.3 See U.C.C. § 2-509 (1977).
12 Examples of such rules include those which permit one party to claim excuse
for breach of contract, or rules that permit contract formation upon the mailing of an
acceptance. See U.C.C. §§ 2-615, -206 (1983).
113 Both depend upon an underlying contract, although the terms of the marriage
contract are typically dictated by the state.
14 See Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1265-66.
131 Some writers have attempted to assess the risk allocation of legal rules in order
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After marriage there are two important types of rights at
stake: those of each individual and those of the marital partner-
ship. These rights are reflected both in community property
statutes and in Kentucky's property division statute. 13 6 If a mar-
ital property rule makes it difficult for the separate estate to
retain separate property, the rule carries with it a "marriage risk
for the individual who is the nonmarital owner."'' 37 Conversely,
if a marital property rule makes it difficult for the marital estate
to accumulate property, the rule places the entire "risk of mar-
riage breakdown" on the marital estate. 138 In either case, broader
policies may be implicated.
The rule announced by the Texas court in Jensen139 does not
directly address the risk allocated to each estate upon commenc-
ing the marriage partnership. However, if "marriage risk" is
defined as the danger of losing the ownership of an asset, the
Texas rule poses no such risk to the separate estate. The incep-
tion of title rule mandates that the separate property owner
retain title to the property.'14 The separate owner's sole problem
is the risk of a particular use of a given capital investment.
Assuming that Robert Jensen had only $50,000 to invest prior
to marriage, he might have taken that money and invested it in
common stock. Additionally, he might have chosen to do so
through the services of a broker. It is also theoretically possible
that, since Robert spent no time or effort other than the minimal
permissible amount under the Texas rule, any appreciation in
to make the argument that certain risk allocations are more efficient than others. See
generally A. POLiNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAw AND ECONO)CS (1983). Others have
argued that cost-benefit analysis and the attendant allocation of risk ignores social values
that are difficult to quantify. See id. at 132. It is not the purpose of this Article to
argue that particular marital property rules are more efficient than others. Rather the
notion of risk has been borrowed from other fields of law in order to demonstrate that
more is at stake for the marital estate than some ephemeral expectation. The notion of
risk and consideration of the economic loss to each estate should help to illuminate the
policy choices that must be made within this area.
'36 See KRS § 403.190; note 103 supra.
,37 Such a risk might not necessarily discourage a party from marrying because
other values associated with marriage could outweigh that risk.
- Placing the entire risk of marriage breakdown on the marriage would seem to
violate the general policies of the Kentucky version of the UMDA. See KRS § 403.110
(1972).
"' See 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984).
,,0 Id.
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value during the marriage would remain separate. 14 1 Upon di-
vorce Robert would retain his separate property portfolio with
its appreciated value. He thus would retain not only his original
investment but also the earning power of that investment. In the
actual Jensen case, Robert Jensen invested his money in a closely
held corporation, a holding company in which he was the "key
man.' '142 Having created the corporation and withdrawn a salary
from it, under the Jensen rule he faces a community claim to
the corporation only if the salary withdrawn was not adequate.' 43
It is apparent that upon divorce there is no "marriage risk"
associated with this form of investment. Robert retains both his
original capital investment and its passive earning power.
The loss to the community on the other hand is quite dif-
ferent. The community has a claim on an intangible asset: the
"efforts of a spouse."' 44 In the above example which depicts
Robert as a passive investor, this intangible asset is free to be
used elsewhere. Since he spends minimal time on his stock,
Robert's skills can be applied in other areas to create wholly
community assets. 145 In the case actually litigated, however, the
community was deprived of the opportunity to be an investor
by the rule of ongoing apportionment and was deprived of the
chance to use Robert's work efforts to create other assets not
related to his separate property. The community was a consumer,
constantly devouring its share of the investment process.'"
In summary, the Jensen rule is free of marriage risk for the
separate property investor. Marriage risk arises if and only if
the fact of marriage threatens the separate property owner with
141 See id.
141 See id. at 108.
14, Id. at 109.
'" See W. DEFuNIAx & M. VAUGHN, supra note 63, at § 62.
141 Of course, he or she might also decide to play golf every day. See Lakenan v.
Lakenan, 64 Cal. Rptr. 166, 167 (Ct. App. 1968) ("He appears to be a great devotee
of golf and to have spent a large portion of his time in the pursuit of that sport.").
However, neither the community property system nor any other marital property system
can guarantee that a spouse will be diligent or successful. What ought not to be barred
is the economic opportunity.
I" Some marital partnerships might, of course, have savings from salary or use
that salary to purchase other valuable assets. Nevertheless, one can assume that in most
instances salary withdrawals will not dissipate capital assets and that the marital part-
nership will not share in their appreciation.
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the loss of his or her capital investment and its earning power.
Under the Jensen rule, the marital community loses an oppor-
tunity to be an investor; it cannot invest its asset-the efforts
of either spouse-in an enterprise that might increase in value
through inherent causes. That effect can be seen by comparing
the Jensen rule to the proportionate rules developed in other
states.
The approach used in Kentucky and by the Moore court in
California might best be labelled a "shared investment" ap-
proach. Although the two states have developed different for-
mulas for implementing the approach, 147 there are a number of
similarities in methodology. California's treatment of appreci-
ated marital property recognizes that the growth value of an
asset may consist of two separate kinds of growth: reduction in
mortgage principal and capital appreciation.148 The California
courts permit both the marital and the separate estates to share
in increases in capital appreciation.149 This treatment of the
marital estate as a joint investor in the inflationary growth of
an asset is a departure from prior California rules that strictly
segregated increased value due to work efforts of one of the
spouses from increased value attributable to inherent causes. 0
The California rule thus produces a marriage related risk for the
separate property claimant. By marrying, the claimant will be
required to share the capital appreciation of an asset with the
marital estate.' On the other hand, if the risk to the marital
estate of marriage breakdown is defined as the economic risk
associated with the lack of marital property available for division
upon dissolution, this risk is significantly reduced under the
'14 See text accompanying notes 22-50, 162-66 supra. A comparison between the
Texas rule in Jensen and the California rule in Moore is not barred by the fact that the
cases deal with different types of property. Although the Moore formula itself could
not be applied to shares of stock in a corporation, both that formula and the Jensen
rule implicate similar issues regarding the community's use of a separate asset and the
community's contributions to that asset. See text accompanying notes 162-66 infra.
"I See In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 211 (Cal. 1980).
149 See id.
110 See Van Camp v. Van Camp, 199 P. 885, 888 (Cal. 1921); Pereira v. Pereira,
103 P. 488, 491 (Cal. 1909).
"I Under California's equal division rule the separate property claimant would lose
one-half of the marital property share. See 6' P.2d at 211.
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California approach. 5 2 To the extent that increased value is due
to inflation, the increase is unearned by either spouse. 153 Allo-
cation of this increase between the estates reflects a respect for
the importance of each estate.
In choosing between the possible approaches consistent with
Kentucky's marital property statute, the "shared investment"
approach is not only preferable but may be required by certain
social policies reflected in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act as adopted in Kentucky. 54 To return to the theme of party
expectations, the diversity of those expectations does not over-
ride the more general social conception that marriage is a part-
nership. Few marital partners would have any expectation that
the risk of marriage breakdown would be assessed entirely against
the marital estate. In addition, few individuals would expect to
152 Obviously many marriages break down without the parties accumulating a
significant amount of marital property. Studies generally show that most divorcing
couples have little or no property. See Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1189, nn.32-34. In
marriages in which entitlement to appreciated value is at issue, however, a significant
amount of property is involved. The economic risk, therefore, is not one associated only
with lack of financial success. Instead, it relates to changed economic circumstances
after a divorce. As Professor Weitzman has aptly demonstrated in her seminal article,
the result of changed economic circumstances after divorce is most likely to mean that
wives suffer serious postdivorce economic erosion. Id. at 1240-53. Moreover, the differ-
ence between the incomes of husbands and wives after divorce increases with income
level. Id. at 1243. The disparity is also significant in long term marriages. Id. at 1248.
53 Inflationary increases represent the fact that it takes $80,000 today to buy what
was a $40,000 home some years ago. It is certainly possible to hypothesize a situation
in which the requirement that the nonmarital claimant share an asset with the marital
partnership will force that claimant to divest himself or herself of the asset without the
ability to acquire a similar asset in an inflated market. Another possibility is that the
nonmarital claimant will have to buy out the marital claimant and that the nonnarital
purchaser will have to pay a significant rate of interest to do so. This problem, however,
is one that is always present upon divorce-it is not possible to divide one pie into two
pieces and leave each person with a whole pie. The Brandenburg formula will apportion
the value of the home between the nonmarital and marital estates according to contri-
bution. If both parties to the marriage now have to seek a home in a new and more
difficult market, there is at least no disparity between them that proceeds from the loss
of contributions made. Moreover, the spouses must act in the same economic market so
that that factor is not a source of disparity. Thus, the risk assigned to the nonmarital
claimant under a source of funds rule does not have the same aura of gender disparity
as the risk to a marital partnership that it will acquire no assets. See note 152 supra.
154 Because the UMDA replaced a statutory scheme that awarded property to the
spouse in whose name that property was held with the marital partnership theory, any
balance to be struck between protecting the individual separate owner and the marital
partnership should weigh the interests of that partnership heavily. The intent of the
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completely lose a separate asset by virtue of marriage. 5 5 The
current Kentucky approach wisely adopts the source of funds
rule, which balances the risks of marriage and divorce between
the nonmarital estate and the marital estate. 56 The source of
funds rule is thus preferable to the Jensen, or inception of title,
approach in that it affords recognition to the importance of the
marriage institution while retaining some status for individuals
within that relationship.
IV. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WITH FORMULAS: IMPLEMENTING
THE SOURCE OF FUNDS RULE
The use of formulas to allocate the interests of the marital
and nonmarital estates has been attacked as an unfair depriva-
UMDA's drafters clearly was to create a larger group of assets available for division
and to minimize the necessity for postmarital support. See UMDA § 308, 9A U.L.A.
160 comment (1973). See also Graham, State Marital Property Laws and Federally
Created Benefits: A Conflict of Laws Analysis, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 49-50 (1982). In
Kentucky, this preference precedes the adoption of the UMDA. See Colley v. Colley,
460 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Ky. 1970). However, it cannot be said to be controlling because
the statute creates a wide variety of exceptions for the characterization of property as
separate. See KRS § 403.190(2). The legislature, therefore, must have intended to balance
the interests of the two estates with some preference for the marital estate.
'" Under Alternative B of UMDA § 307, that possibility exists. See UMDA § 307
Alternative B, 9A U.L.A. 143 comment (1973). That section makes available for division
all property however and whenever acquired. See UMDA § 307 Alternative B, 9A
U.L.A. 143. In one state which originally adopted such a rule, recent legislative amend-
ments have now exempted from division gifts to individual spouses from third parties.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). That amendment is based
upon the legislature's determination that failure to exempt such property from division
frustrated party expectations. See id.
'I In other states, that balance is being struck very differently. See CAL. Cr¢. CODE
§ 4800 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). Under California rules relating to property held as
joint tenants, the separate property claimant may receive as reimbursement only the
separate equity in the property which existed at the time it was converted into a joint
tenancy. See In re Marriage of Neal, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341, 346 (Ct. App. 1984). The
California rule for joint tenancy property has been criticized as being inequitable to the
separate estate. See In re Marriage of Huxley, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1693 (Oct. 30,
1984); Buol v. Buol, 10 F m. L. REP. (BNA) 1599, 1600 (Aug. 16, 1984). Illinois has
adopted an approach at the other end of the spectrum. Under that state's approach, a
marital partnership can claim a share of appreciation based on the nonmonetary contri-
bution of a spouse only if the nonowner spouse made a "significant" contribution and
the asset appreciated substantially. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1984).
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tion of the trial court's historical discretion when acting in
equity.'5 7 In Kentucky, formulas have been said to prevent "fair"
division in many cases.'58 In order to analyze this criticism, it is
necessary to consider what is meant by unfairness. Some of the
perceived unfairness arises from recurrent disparity between the
economic positions of the spouses after divorce.'5 9 Another as-
pect of the unfairness charge, however, relates to the Branden-
burg formula's requirement that the marital estate pay the taxes
and interest on real property without receiving credit for that
payment.'16 The former charge against the use of formulas is
but an aspect of public perceptions of unfairness in the divorce
process while the latter is a specific complaint against the for-
mula itself.'
6'
Neither the Kentucky Brandenburg formula 62 nor the for-
mula adopted by the California courts credits the community
estate with the payment of taxes and interest.' 63 In Moore, the
California Supreme Court rejected the claim that its formula
unfairly required the marital estate to service the mortgage ob-
ligation by payment of interest and taxes.164 The court reasoned
that such contributions were irrelevant to a formula designed to
divide appreciated value because they were not part of capital
investment. 165 More importantly, the court implied that if the
community were credited with such payments, the separate prop-
erty claimant might be permitted to charge an offsetting amount
for the community's use of the property.'
66
See 617 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (Gudgel, J., concurring).
,' See Potter & Ewing, supra note 14, at 34.
,59 See Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1249-53.
160 See Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 873.
"I1 Both critics and trial courts have ignored the fact that judicial discretion can
function even within the context of the Brandenburg formula. Once the amount of
marital property is determined, a trial court retains wide discretion to allocate that
property. See Johnson v. Johnson, 564 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The nonmarital
property claimant does not lose all of the marital estate's share under the Brandenburg
rule. Rather, the marital share is available for just division. See KRS § 403.190 (West
1984).
6I See 617 S.W.2d at 873.
163 See In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1980).
364 See id. at 210.
'6 See id. at 211.
16 See id.
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The implication that the separate property owner might be
entitled to offsetting compensation raises a number of problems.
Although the Moore court indicated that the value of the com-
munity's use of the property would merely offset the interest
and taxes paid, 67 this may not be so. Suppose that the wife
owned a home prior to marriage and that the mortgage payment
on the home was $400, $350 of Which represented amounts
payable for interest and taxes. Suppose further that the marital
partnership decided to live in the house and that mortgage
payments were made from the salaries of either or both spouses.
Moore implies that paying $350 for interest and taxes is the
same as renting the property. 68 The $350 payment is not the
rental value of the property, which might be more or less than
$400. Instead, it is the rental cost of the money borrowed by
the wife to purchase the property prior to marriage. Indeed, it
is highly unlikely that the two figures, interest payment and fair
rental value, bear any relationship to each other since they would
be influenced by entirely different economic factors.
Some commentators have suggested that a more equitable
approach would credit the community with the entire loan bal-
ance and require the community to discharge the loan obliga-
tion. 69 This solution has been rejected by the California courts
70
and accounts for some of the major differences between the
formula used in Moore and that adopted by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in Brandenburg. In Moore, the separate property
claimant was the loan obligor.' 7' The Moore formula established
the separate property share by comparing the down payment
and the total loan value less community payments on loan prin-
cipal to the purchase price of the asset. 172 The Brandenburg
167 See id.
16 See id.
169 See, e.g., Potter & Ewing, supra note 14, at 15.
110 See, e.g., 618 P.2d at 211.
"7 Id. California presumes that loans acquired during the marriage are community
property unless the creditor intends to look to the separate assets of the acquiring spouse.
See In re Marriage of Stoner, 195 Cal. Rptr. 351, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1983). Cf. O'Neill
v. O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Bodie v. Bodie, 590 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979) (both holding that debts acquired during marriage are not presumed
marital debts).
1 See 618 P.2d at 211.
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formula does not credit either estate with the loan value; it
compares actual contributions only.
173
Because the California formula allocates the credit for the
loan value to the estate liable on the loan, it treats the loan as
a valuable community asset. In certain situations the investment
opportunity provided by a loan with a low interest rate may
indeed have functional value that would permit its characteri-
zation as "property."' 7 4 Even where the loan is the "property"
of a separate owner, it has been maintained through partnership
expenditures. 175 One possible solution could recognize both the
value of the loan as property and the contribution of the part-
nership by payment of taxes and interest. This solution would
require the loan obligor to reimburse the marital partnership for
the interest and taxes it had paid and to pay a reasonable rate
of interest as if he or she had borrowed that amount from the
community.
Another problem raised by the Robinson-Brandenburg for-
mulas relates to the failure of the Kentucky courts to take into
account the possibility of nonmonetary contributions that en-
hance the value of separate property. In other jurisdictions,
courts have treated nonmonetary contributions to separate prop-
erty as creating a compensable right to reimbursement. 76 In most
cases, however, these nonmonetary contributions have been work
effort actually expended upon repair of the property or improve-
ments to the property. 77 The Kentucky courts have rejected the
notion that a nonmonetary contribution by a homemaker spouse
could convert separate property into marital property. 78 It is not
clear whether the courts would also discount more direct contri-
butions to the enhancement of property value.7 9 If such contri-
butions have a fair market value it would be possible to include
" See 617 S.W.2d at 873.
174 Such assets may be marital property. But see McGlone v. McGlone, 613 S.W.2d
419 (Ky. 1981) (Veteran's Administration grant held to be nonmarital property).
,71 See text accompanying notes 162-74 supra.
176 See Portillo v. Shappie, 636 P.2d 878, 883 (N.M. 1981); Jensen v. Jensen, 665
S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984).
See 636 P.2d at 883.
See 617 S.W.2d at 873.
,79 Suppose, for example, that one spouse provided work and labor which directly
enhanced the other's real property. See In re Marriage of Olsen, 451 N.E.2d 825 (IIl.
1983) (requiring the contribution to be significant).
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them in any future formulation of rules for apportioning sepa-
rate and marital property.
CONCLUSION
An examination of various state rules for the division of
appreciated property upon divorce demonstrates that few states
have encountered facile solutions to the problem. The Kentucky
courts have developed an approach which attempts to balance
the rights for both the marital and nonmarital estates when each
estate has contributed to property acquisition. Since an exami-
nation of past cases reveals that other considerations may also
be involved in making a fair division, the courts will need to
adopt an even more flexible attitude toward formulation of the
marital and nonmarital interests. Courts will need to consider,
for example, how to treat the marital partnership's payment of
interest and taxes on real property and how the concepts under-
lying the Brandenburg formula should apply to business assets.
For the legislature the problem is a larger one. It must
consider whether the property division statute as currently im-
plemented by the courts strikes a fair balance between the marital
and nonmarita estates. Any rule that decreases the potential for
marital property will have a significant impact upon homemaker
spouses, especially in long-term marriages. 8 0 Rules that limit the
marital estate usually cause homemakers to leave the marriage
with little or nothing. A fall in the number of purely homemaker
spouses may not, however, lead to a conclusion that rules aug-
menting the marital estate can be abandoned.' 8 ' Men's earning
capacity continues to significantly exceed that of women.' 82 For
that reason rules that limit the marital estate will widen the gap
between the spouses' financial circumstances after divorce.
110 See, e.g., Atwood v. Atwood, 643 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Combs v.
Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). See also Weitzman, supra note 2, at 1246-
49.
UI See note 106 supra.
,s A thirty-five year old male with four years of college has an expected lifetime
earning capacity of $956,000. A female of the same age and education has a projected
earning capacity of $335,000. SrATsncAL ABSTRACT OF TBE UNITED STATES 470 (104 ed.
1984). A forty-five year old woman with four years of college can expect to earn
$207,000 during her working lifetime; a similarly situated male can expect to earn
$639,000 during the same period. Id.
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The real barriers to fairness and equality in this area are
connected to two problems. The first problem lies in our failure
to recognize an underlying social problem which is broader than
divorce. Disparate pay and work opportunities for men and
women have substantial economic effect whether or not individ-
uals are married or unmarried. Resolving this disparity in the
context of divorce makes marriage an avenue for the reallocation
of wealth between men and women. Although this may not be
unfair in some contexts, we may ask ourselves whether healthy
marital relationships are promoted by such uses of the institution
of marriage in lieu of a frontal attack on the problem. A second
barrier to fairness is the tendency to form one rule to cover a
variety of marital relationships. In Kentucky, this inclination is
joined with a rule disfavoring private agreements that would
produce a different allocation of property on divorce from that
permitted by statute.183 Thus, long-term marriages in which one
ap ouse works only within the home are subject to the same rules
shorter marriages in which the spouses' contributions arise in
substantially similar ways.
Kentucky's property division statute will be strengthened by
a rule which gives consideration to both flexibility and fairness.
A formula such as that used in Brandenburg illuminates what is
at stake in the development of such a rule and challenges the
limits of fairness and flexibility.
"I See Jackson v. Jackson, 571 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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